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Informed capital is a crucial ingredient to a well-functioning market for start-up 
finance, especially in times of difficult market conditions. For bank-based 
systems, the question regarding which investors actually supply informed capital 
has not yet been answered. To fill this gap, we conduct a survey among 85 
German suppliers of start-up finance. We find significant differences between the 
investors which are linked to banks and those financiers which are not. Although, 
the bank-related group, including public equity suppliers, delivers some sort of 
informed capital, venture capital companies and Business Angels are the key 
providers of informed capital in the German market for start-up finance. 
 
 
JEL-classification:  G21, G24, D21, M13, O16 




“Informiertes Kapital im schwierigen Marktumfeld –Relationship-Investoren in 
Deutschland“ 
 
Informiertes Kapital ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil eines funktionierenden Marktes 
für Existenzgründungsfinanzierung. Im bankzentrierten deutschen Finanzsystem 
stehen neben VC-Gesellschaften auch Hausbanken im Ruf, die Voraussetzung für 
die Bereitstellung von informiertem Kapital zu erfüllen. Daher ist die Frage, wel-
che Investoren hierzulande in welchem Maße informiertes Kapital anbieten, noch 
ungeklärt. Dieser Artikel leistet auf der Grundlage einer persönlichen Befragung 
von 85 Existenzgründungsfinanciers einen Beitrag, diese Lücke zu schließen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Gruppe der bankähnlichen Financiers, inklusive 
öffentlicher Anbieter, zu einem bestimmten Maße informiertes Kapital anbietet. 
Die Gruppe der unabhängigen Start-up Financiers, bestehend aus VC-Gesell-
schaften und Business Angels, aber die Hauptanbieter auf dem Markt darstellt. 
 
 
JEL-Klassifikation:  G21, G24, D21, M13, O16 
Schlagworte:   Informiertes  Kapital, Existenzgründungsfinanzierung, 
Venture Capital, Banken.  
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1.  Introduction 
Informed capital is commonly considered as being pivotal for growth prospects 
of risky start-ups. Relational investors such as venture capital companies are expected 
to provide consulting services and promote their portfolio firms’ professionalism 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002). The term informed capital for this kind of service is 
derived from the fact that in order to be successful a high expertise of both the firm 
itself and the employed technology is necessary. The intermediary needs to actively 
participate in both the information flow within the firm and between the firm and its 
business environment. Several studies found evidence that VC firms spend substantial 
time and effort to assist, to advise, and to monitor their portfolio firms (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2004; Macmillan et al., 1988; Sapienza,1992; Sapienza et al., 1996). Thus, 
this means that the VC companies invest in obtaining proprietary information about 
their clients’ businesses.  
In this paper we define informed capital as a specific form of capital 
engagement by a financial intermediary. In particular, informed capital is characterized 
by a flow of information in two directions: information flows from the company to the 
financiers and consultancy and support flows in the opposite direction. The financier 
has some control- and information-rights to enforce the flow of data concerning the 
financed firm’s development in management, technology, and product marketing. In 
return, the investor has to fulfill certain duties which are predominantly of an advisory 
or consulting nature. The flow of information continues during the whole investment 
period. As a result of this reciprocal information process, both parties obtain 
knowledge about each other. We analyze, in particular, how both the intensity of the 
reciprocal information flow and the intensity of the control and consulting services 
differ among distinct types of relational investors.  
In the market-based US-financial system, VC companies and Business Angels 
are commonly considered unique relational investors. However, the situation may 
differ in a bank-based system like the one in Germany. The German financial system is 
characterized by two important features: one is the famous Hausbank-principle and the 
second is the importance of public intermediaries in firm financing. The Hausbank-
principle is based on a close relationship between the bank and its client-firm.  
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Hausbanks are involved in the businesses they finance, and they monitor them closely 
(Elsas and Krahnen, 2004). Thus, many German commercial banks can be viewed as 
relational investors, too. Moreover, despite the fact that public financing is often said 
to be passive by nature (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), several references are made in the 
literature indicating that German public equity suppliers are different because they are 
seeking to establish a close relationship with their target firms (Hood, 2000). Given 
that in the German system both the VC firms and banks are believed to be relational 
investors and public VCs are important players in start-up finance, the most natural 
question to ask is what makes the difference between different types of relational 
investors? 
Although, a variety of potential providers of informed capital exists, thus far 
little work has been done to actually test to what extent these believed relational 
investors can compete with independent VC firms, particularly when it comes to 
financing start-up companies within a bank-based system. We contribute to fill this 
gap. Our study is guided by the following research questions: “Who actually provides 
informed capital in Germany’s bank-based system?” “What kind of informed capital is 
provided by distinct types of relational investors?” and “What determines the provision 
of informed capital?”. 
We deal with these questions regarding the background with a specific market 
development: the follow-up of a sharp downturn. In the 1990s, Germans began to view 
VC as an important source for economic dynamism. Intense political promotion and 
the introduction of a specialized bourse for growth firms created the necessary 
incentives for German VC companies to enter the market. Consequently, the German 
VC industry experienced a boom in the late 1990s. This upswing ended abruptly in 
2000 with the deterioration of the stock markets, particularly in the growth segments of 
the bourses. Unexpectedly the slump turned out to be more of a long-term 
phenomenon rather than a short episode. The German VC industry’s early stage 
investments between 2000 and 2004 slipped from 1.6 billion Euros to 0.35 billion 
Euros.
1 In addition to the weakening investments, the enthusiasm of the investors, 
policy makers, and entrepreneurs in the VC industry had vanished. 
                                                 
1 German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, 2004.  
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Most of the research which investigates informed capital in more detail covers 
periods of upswings in the market for financing young and innovative companies. 
However, little is known about how financing companies cope with a hostile market 
environment and how the provision of informed capital is affected by sharp downturns 
in the market for start-up finance. On the one hand, if business becomes less profitable, 
cost-cutting could be an appropriate option. Since the provision of informed capital is 
expensive, this service could be negatively affected and, consequently, it becomes less 
important for the relational investor. On the other hand, if the market is in a negative 
state, the financier’s support may gain even more importance for the firm’s 
performance. This latter conjecture would imply that in tough business environments 
the provision of informed capital may become even more important for both the 
investor and the portfolio firm. Thus, the predicted impact of a strong downturn on the 
behavior of relational investors is ambiguous. Our paper investigates how Germany’s 
relational investors actually behaved in recent periods after the irrational exuberance 
vanished.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we outline the 
hypotheses. Section 4 develops the method for measuring the nature and the intensity 
of the information flow between the financier and the portfolio firm. In Section 5, we 
describe the data set. Section 6 presents the methodology, followed by the results in 
section 7. In Section 8, we draw conclusions for the policy as well as for further 
research.  
2.  What do we expect from the different types of start-up investors? 
In this section we briefly outline our expectations about the investors’ capacity 
to provide portfolio companies with informed capital. Several surveys that summarize 
the findings on VC investment clearly state that VC companies are rather highly 
involved in the business of the financed companies (Macmillan et al., 1988; Hellmann 
and Puri, 2002; Lerner, 1995), have intensive contacts (Sapienza, 1992), and are well 
informed in regard to the financed companies’ business through constant monitoring 
(Gompers, 1995). Corporate VC firms are believed to initiate an even more intensive 
flow of information than their independent counterparts (Bottazzi et al., 2004) due to a 
higher ratio of strategic investments (Block and MacMillan, 1993) and due to better  
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technical skills (Chesbrough, 2000). Therefore, we expect that VC companies are 
delivering a fully developed menu of informed capital services.  
Hypothesis 1. VC firms deliver a high level of informed capital. 
Business Angels, which are the main part of the informal VC market, are also 
considered to be deeply involved in the businesses they finance (Mason and Harrison, 
1996; Osnabrugge, 1998). Furthermore, they often invest for hedonistic and altruistic 
reasons. Private benefits such as "happiness" created by the development of the 
company should improve the cooperation and result in a heavier flow of information 
between the Angels and their target firm (Sullivan and Miller, 1996). Thus, parallel to 
the literature, we do not expect to find a great difference in the provision of informed 
capital between informal VC suppliers, i.e., Business Angels and independent and 
corporate VC firms. 
Hypothesis 2.  Business Angels deliver informed capital on a similar level as VC 
companies. 
Several aspects of the financial system suggest that German banks build a 
second group of potential suppliers of informed capital. German banks have a long 
history in relationship banking and in playing an active role in corporate control 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). Relationship-based financing is still considered to be the core 
business of most German banking institutions. German universal banks have never 
been legally restricted in both their contracting behavior and their ability to exert 
corporate control. As so-called Hausbanks, credit suppliers are prepared to be involved 
in their firms’ business (Elsas and Krahnen, 2004). Recently, German banks have 
started to fiercely promote certain types of mezzanine financial instruments for small- 
and medium-sized ventures. They have also set out subsidiary VC organizations in 
order to expand their equity financing.  
In principle credit suppliers should behave differently from the equity suppliers 
since they sell different financial products and follow distinct strategies and goals. 
Nonetheless, a Hausbank-relationship is characterized by constant interactions, 
reciprocal flow of information (Elsas and Krahnen, 2004, 208f.), and even a direct  
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influence on the financed companies by the creditor (Elsas, 2004). This behavior is 
compatible to what Boot (2000) called relationship financing. Thus, we expect them to 
provide informed capital for start-ups, especially as the Hausbank-relationship is 
common for financing small-sized and medium-sized companies which are high risks 
(Edwards and Fischer, 1994, 143; Lehman and Neuberger, 2001).  
However, in the case of start-up financing, there are some caveats to mention 
that may constrain credit suppliers. First, credit transactions are likely to be based 
heavily on pre-investment information such as balance sheet statements and collateral. 
Due to the collateral, parts of the investor’s risk exposure come from the fluctuations 
of the pledged assets’ value. Thus, relational credit financiers may focus less on both 
the consulting activities and a regular exchange of information regarding the project’s 
development but rather focus more on the assets, more than uncollateralized equity 
financiers would do (Manove et al., 2001). Secondly, the loan officers may have 
predominantly built up expertise on financial issues but lack technological knowledge. 
Given these caveats, we expect credit financiers to place more weight on information 
about the collateral’s value and financial reports than equity financiers. 
Hypothesis 3. Banks as credit financiers offer only a reduced menu of informed capital 
services.  
We expect a VC-like behavior, as previously mentioned, in the provision of 
informed capital for the banks’ VC subsidiaries. Bank-related VC companies seem to 
have similar investment criteria and employ analogous monitoring and consulting 
strategies (Bottazzi et al., 2004). However, their integration into the institutional 
background of banks and the dependency on their mother company might influence 
their aims and, therefore, their strategy (Tykvova, 2004; Osnabrugge and Robinson, 
2001). 
Hypothesis 4a. Similar to their independent counterparts, bank-related VC firms offer 
a full menu of informed capital services. 
Hypothesis 4b. Similar to their parent companies, bank-related VC firms offer a 
reduced menu of informed capital services.  
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Public VC firms own a considerable market share in the start-up finance sector. 
Their lower return requirements (Bascha and Walz, 2002) in combination with strong 
ambitions to contribute to the local economic development (see e.g., Sunley et al., 
2005; Tykvova, 2004) may allow and force these entities to establish an even more 
intensive contact to the target firms than their private counterparts can afford.  
Hypothesis 5. Public equity suppliers offer a full range of informed capital services. 
3.  How can the flow of information be measured? 
In this section we introduce the concept for measuring the provision of 
informed capital in detail. To capture the notion of informed capital as a reciprocal 
information process, we employ the concept of knowledge building. As Nonaka (1994) 
defines it, “… knowledge is created and organized on the very flow of information.” 
Knowledge can be divided analytically into two types (Polanyi, 1966). The first type is 
the so-called explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be codified and documented 
in the form of reports such as business assessments or balance-sheet statements. These 
features make information sharing among individuals fairly easy. Ergo, we measure 
the flow of explicit knowledge or information by the frequency of the codified 
information exchange, e.g., in the form of reports.  
The second form, tacit knowledge, is more complex to handle. Tacit knowledge 
cannot be easily translated into numbers or even into words and is heavily linked with 
the individual itself. Typical examples are practical expertise or knowledge that a 
person gains by personally experiencing a specific situation. Tacit knowledge usually 
cannot be codified because of its implicit character (Nonaka, 1994). It is difficult to 
communicate and to share tacit knowledge via documenting, in particular, since it is 
often attached to what von Hippel (1994) calls sticky information. The exchange of 
sticky information is difficult and costly. Personal interaction is necessary for 
acquiring tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). Thus, we employ the frequency of personal 
contacts and the amount of consulting services delivered by the investor as proxies for 
the extent to which tacit knowledge is exchanged between the two parties.  
Based on the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge, the data set 
allows us to identify the different components of informed capital.  
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4.  A first look at the data 
The analysis is based on a survey that provides us with micro data on the nature 
and the dimension of the flow of information between the investors and the portfolio 
firms. The survey was carried out between September 2004 and September 2005. It 
consists of 85 face-to-face interviews with different kinds of financiers which at least 
partly offer start-up financing and are located in distinct regional areas of Germany. 
The interviews are based on a largely standardized questionnaire. In detail, we have 
interviewed 22 VC companies, independent and corporate ones; eleven Business 
Angels; 21 banks of two types, public savings and private commercial banks; 
seventeen of their VC subsidiaries; and twelve public providers of equity.
2 After 
clearing the sample with respect to those financiers which do not offer any start-up 
financing, 75 observations remain. 
The participants of the study are taken from member lists of the German 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, the Business Angels Network 
Germany, and the Association of German Banks. By focusing on these financiers that 
are still actively offering money for innovative young companies, we tried to build a 
sample that is representative of the different types of financial institutions and we are 
not aware of any bias in this sample.  
The financiers in the sample cover a wide range of potential suppliers of 
informed capital and differ strongly in their structure.
3 However, there is partial 
homogeneity with respect to the offered financial products, which is important for the 
level of informed capital. Through lower participation in the portfolio company’s 
return and fewer rights of involvement, silent partnerships, mezzanine products, and 
credit might be connected with less monitoring and consulting and, therefore, represent 
a lower level of informed capital than direct equity investments (Bascha and Walz, 
2002).  
Apart from commercial and savings banks, which almost exclusively use credit 
financing, all other intermediaries in our survey offer equity capital or at least products 
that are equity linked. The majority of the equity-group directly invests and acquires 
                                                 
2 We have to note that the banks and their subsidiaries are dominated by savings banks because they are 
more active in start-up financing than their private counterparts. 
3 We have to annotate that the information about the financiers solely count for the interviewed 
departments or branches and not for the whole companies.  
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minority stakes in the portfolio firms. The second largest group of equity-investors 
uses silent equity and mezzanine products. Table 1 shows the average importance of 
the used financial products in a range from one, i.e., the investor does not use this 
product at all, to four, which means that this product is most frequently used. For 
example, the value 3.95 in line one indicates that banks concentrate almost totally on 
loans, whereas the figures around 1 indicate that the other types of financiers hardly 
use them. Silent equity investments and mezzanine financing occur more frequently 
with the bank’s VC subsidiaries and public equity suppliers, respectively. Minority 
holdings are preferred by VC companies and Business Angels.  
Table 1: Importance of financial products (mean values) 
Importance of product:  VCs  Business 




Credits  1.05 1.27 3.95 1.00 1.00 
Silent  investments  1.04 1.00 1.31 2.43 3.33 
Mezzanine  products  1.00 1.00 1.37 1.19 1.33 
Minority  holdings  up  to  25%  3.00 2.28 1.00 2.29 1.67 
Minority  holdings  25-50%  3.14 3.64 1.00 3.57 2.67 
 
A more heterogenic structure from the sample can be seen with regard to the 
managed portfolios. The portfolio size ranges from one company in a Business 
Angel’s portfolio to around 1,500 financed companies in a bank’s portfolio. 
Furthermore, the coaching load of investment managers covers a wide spectrum. On 
the one end of the spectrum, we find a VC firm with a ratio of 0.75 firms per manager. 
On the other end lies a bank whose portfolio managers have to coach on average 375 
firms per person. Most likely such differences influence the quality of the informed 
capital. The more companies a manager has to advise the less time he can spend on 
each of them. Figure 1 clearly suggests that portfolio managers of banks are, on 
average, much more time restricted in their coaching activities per firm than any other 






















Banks Bank - VCs Public-VCs
 
Figure 1: Portfolio firms per investment manager 
Table 2 depicts two further portfolio attributes that are said to influence the 
level of informed capital because of the different needs for consulting activity: the 
share of early stage investments and the average investment period. Both features 
clearly differentiate the sample. On average, the banks, the Business Angels, and the 
public VC companies tend to show the longest investment horizon with more than 70 
months; although, the average share of early stage investments in their portfolio differs 
drastically between around 30 percent and more than 90 percent. In contrast, the VC 
firms follow a rather short-term strategy with respect to the investment horizon (55 
months) and invest on average more than two thirds of their money in early stages. 
Table 2: Average share of early stage investments and average investment period per 
portfolio (in percentage) 
  
Share of early stage investments in 
portfolio (in percentage) 
Average investment period 
in months 
    
VCs 70.91  55.75 
      
Business Angels  92.73  70.00 
      
Banks 48.34 78.83 
      
Bank-VCs 53.50  63.08 
      
Public-VCs 29.22  74.50  
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Upon first looking at the data, it clearly indicates that the type of financier 
matters for the provision of informed capital. First, it is obvious that most investors 
tend to concentrate on one or two financial products. Second, the resources for the time 
spent on the supply of informed capital vary highly among investor types. And third, 
the amount of early stage investments and the average investment period show rather 
clear distinctions between different types of financiers. In the following sections, we 
investigate the distinct features more deeply. 
5.  Methodology 
5.1 Variables 
To answer our research questions, we group our data into two sets of variables 
that capture the different directions of the information flow. We use the frequency of 
reports (weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly) and the contents as an indicator for the 
flow of information from the firm to the financier. The flow of information in the 
opposite direction is measured by the importance and the magnitude of the financier’s 
consulting activity.  
In addition to quantifiable information such as the share of early stage 
investments in a portfolio, the data contain two types of categorical variables. The first 
type (Type A) varies within the range: never (1), seldom (2), frequently (3), very 
frequently (4). For example, if asked “How often do you receive accounting reports 
from your portfolio firm?” the respondent had the choice between the four alternatives. 
The second type (Type B) results from questions that aim at receiving a personal 
assessment of the financier’s investment activity such as “How important do you 
consider your advice for the success of your portfolio firm?” In this case, the 
respondent had to decide between the alternatives not important (1), of minor 
importance (2), amongst other things important (3), very important (4), dominant (5). 
Furthermore, we include two variables concerning the frequency of interaction 
between the two parties that can be used as a proxy for the flow of information in both 
directions. We asked for the frequency of contacts per month, either personal or via 
telecommunication means. These two variables are not categorical. The following 
paragraph provides a formal definition for all variables we use in the analysis:  
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CONSULTING (CS) is the frequency of the financier’s consulting (Type A).  
INFLUENCE (INF) shows the importance of influence by the financier (Type A). 
EARLY-STAGE (EARL) is a variable that gives the percentage of early stage 
investment in the considered portfolio. 
INVESTMENT-PERIOD (INVPER) is the average investment period in months. 
Finally, we use Type B variables to indicate how important a specific financial product 
is for the financier: 
CRED is credit financing.  
MIHO25 is the minority holding up to 25 percent of the stakes. 
MIHO50 is the minority holding between 25 percent and 50 percent of the stakes. 
SILENT is the silent investment
4. 
MEZZ is the mezzanine product. 
5.2 Who provides informed capital? 
Table 3 shows the average values of the main variables for the five groups of 
financial intermediaries. Parallel to earlier research, we find that VC companies offer a 
high-level of informed capital. The first row reveals that VC firms use both forms of 
knowledge transfer – the explicit and implicit form – very intensely. In addition, they 
are more deeply involved in the business of the financed companies than the other 
types of financiers. VC firms do not only consult most frequently (lines 1 to 10) and 
exert direct influence (line 18) but are also well informed about what is going on in the 
portfolio companies (lines 12 to 15). Furthermore, they report, on average, a high 
frequency of contacts with their portfolio firms (lines 16 and 17). These results support 
hypothesis 1. 
Business Angels largely behave in line with formal VC suppliers but fall 
behind in some aspects. This is especially evident for some kinds of consulting (lines 8 
to 10) and reporting (lines 14 and 15). This restraint can be grounded in their relatively 
                                                 
4 Silent equity is a specific financial product and a rather passive kind of investments per definition 
since almost no influence rights are attached to it.   
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strong specialization, the restricted resources, and a very close informal relationship to 
their portfolio companies. Nevertheless, the statistics seems to back hypothesis 2. 
In contrast, lines 12 and 18 show that banks as loan suppliers are hardly 
interested in the business of their start-up portfolio companies. As indicated in lines 1 
to 12, this attitude results in a less intensive and a rather specific consulting activity. 
Moreover, the portfolio firms report less frequently (line 12) and interaction is rather 
scarce (lines 16 and 17). Such a behavior corresponds with hypothesis 3.  
Table 3: Importance of variables (mean values) 
Line Frequency  of…  VCs  Business 




1     consulting  3.91  3.92  3.21 3.71 3.60 
               
  Frequency of consulting in…         
2     accounting  2.36 2.00 2.58  2.64  2.56 
3     controlling  2.5  1.82  2.47 2.79 2.78 
4     marketing  2.6  2.18  2.11 2.43 1.78 
5     technical problems  2.36 1.55 1.05  1.50  1.44 
6     strategical problems  3.60 3.18 2.53  3.43  3.11 
7     network advantages  3.00 3.27 2.37  2.71  2.56 
8     financing  3.50 2.00 3.79  3.29  3.44 
9     patent protection  2.60 1.36 1.26  1.79  1.33 
10     juridical problems  2.27 1.18 1.32  1.43  1.56 
11  Importance of consulting for 
success of portfolio firm  4.23 4.46 3.74  4.00  3.99 
               
  Frequency of…         
12     reports  3.00 2.73 2.16  2.93  2.67 
               
  Thereof reports about…         
13     business assessments  3.96 4.00 3.90  3.93  4.00 
14     collateral  1.23 1.00 2.68  1.36  1.78 
15     technological development  3.27 2.18 2.26  2.79  2.44 
               
16  Number of face-to-face contacts 
(per month)  1.35 1.64 0.43  1.06  1.03 
17  Number of contacts via 
telecommunication (per month)  8.05  3.73  1.60  4.21 2.30 
               
18  Degree of influence by the financier  3.32 2.55 2.11  2.86  2.44  
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VC-subsidiaries of banks are in some respect very similar to their mother 
companies. On average, they report less frequent interactions with their portfolio firms 
(lines 16 and 17) than Business Angels and the group of independent and corporate VC 
companies. Overall, consulting activities (lines 1 to 10) are of minor importance for 
bank-dependent VC firms; although, they offer similar products as independent and 
corporate VC companies. Their consulting activity is mainly focused on financing 
issues and business related topics such as strategic problems. These findings support 
hypothesis 4b more than hypothesis 4a. 
The public equity suppliers show a fairly similar pattern to the bank 
subsidiaries. On the one hand, they indicate a strong involvement in the business of the 
portfolio firms by a rather high frequency of consulting in some areas (see e.g., lines 
1/3 and 8). On the other hand, they hardly reach the overall average of contacts per 
month (lines 16 and 17). Such findings do not correspond with hypothesis 5. However, 
they suggest that the public equity suppliers offer only a reduced menu of informed 
capital services. 
Line 11 shows an interesting finding on how German start-up financiers judge 
the importance of consulting. Despite considerable differences in the amount of 
consulting services offered to the companies, all types of financiers regard consulting 
as an important driver for the portfolio firm’s success. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics of the different components of the informed 
capital menu show that all financiers offer some sort of informed capital, but there are 
considerable differences in the intensity of information flows. Furthermore, an 
immediate intuition derived from the descriptive analysis suggests that the market for 
informed capital is segmented. On the one hand, there is the “bank-related” group 
containing private commercial and public savings banks as credit and equity 
financiers. On the other hand, there is the “non-bank” group that includes VC firms 
and Business Angels. Unfortunately, table 3 does not provide us with a clear-cut 
intuition on how to group public equity suppliers. However due to fairly similar 
resources and comparable institutional background – some public VC companies are 
subsidiaries of public merchant and development banks – we subsume them under the 
segment of the bank-related group. Thus, we arrive at the following market 
segmentation hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 6. The market for informed capital is dichotomously segmented. One 
segment consists of independent and corporate VC firms and Business Angels. The 
other segment entails commercial and savings banks, VC subsidiaries of these banks, 
and public equity suppliers. 
6.  Tests and Results 
6.1 Segmentation 
We explore the dichotomy as stated in hypothesis 6 by employing the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
5 This test allows the comparison of two samples by 
assigning a rank to each single observation. Furthermore, the test is able to reveal the 
relation of two groups even if the assumption of a normal distribution is violated, or if 
the variances between the sub-samples are inhomogeneous.  
To be clear, we name the first segment the “bank-related group.” The second 
segment is denoted as the “non-bank group.” The dummy variable “group” is zero for 
the bank-related group (42 observations) and one for the non-bank group (33 
observations). Table 4 illustrates the results. A negative z-value indicates that the sum 
of the ranks for the bank-related group must be smaller than the sum of the ranks for 
the non-bank group. For example, the value -3.56 in the first row of table 4 indicates a 
more frequent consulting by the non-bank group. The p-value in the second column of 
0.00 reveals that the result is significant at the 1%-level. 
The findings from the rank-sum test confirm hypothesis 6. The flow of explicit 
and tacit knowledge is significantly different between the two groups. For example, the 
non-bank group receives reports from the start-ups significantly more often than the 
bank-related group. These results indicate that the flow of information is more intense 
in this group. The reporting activity in the bank-related group focuses predominantly 
on collateral. Furthermore, the frequency of personal contacts in both forms, face-to-
face and via telecommunication, is significantly lower for the bank-related group.  
By examining the responses in regard to the flow of information that goes from 
the financier to the financed company, we can conclude that the non-bank group is also 
more involved in the business of their portfolio firms. We observe differences in the 
                                                 
5 The two sample ranks-sum test is the non-parametric version of the independent samples t-test.  
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amount of consulting and the areas covered. For example, the non-bank group delivers 
more consulting in technical, strategic, patent-related, and juridical problems. Any of 
the differences are significant at the 5 percent level, at least. Not surprisingly, we fail 
to find many significant differences in business related topics such as accounting or 
financing. In these areas, bank-related financiers and non-bank intermediaries are 
likely to have comparable skills. However, there is a significant distinction concerning 
the degree of the financier’s influence on the portfolio firms, which is the strongest 
form of information flow. Non-bank financiers consider the exertion of influence as 
significantly more important than their bank-related counterparts.  
Table 4: Comparison of bank-related financiers and non-banks 
Frequency of…  z-value p-value 
   consulting -3.56  0.00** 
         
Frequency of specific consulting in…     
   accounting 1.95  0.05 
   controlling 2.24  0.03* 
   marketing -1.81  0.07 
   technichal problems  -4.32  0.00** 
   strategical problems  -2.67  0.01* 
   network advantages  -3.35  0.00** 
   financing 0.93  0.35 
   patent protection  -3.06  0.00** 
   juridical problems  -2.57  0.01* 
Importance of consulting for success of portfolio firm  -3.01 0.00** 
    
Frequency of…     
   reports  -3.57 0.00** 
         
Thereof reports about…     
   business assessments  -0.34  0.69 
   collateral 4.67  0.00** 
   technological development  -2.16  0.03* 
         
   Number of face-to-face contacts (per month)  -3.24  0.00** 
   Number of contacts via telecommunication (per month)  -3.83 0.00** 
         
Degree of influence by the financier  -3.61  0.00** 
* significant at a 5%-level; ** significant at a 1%-level  
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As both groups use a variety of financial products, the results from the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test indicate that the market segmentation is rather based on 
the institutional background than on the specific financial product that is used for 
financing. In the next section, we explore the possible impact of the financial product 
in more detail and take a closer look at additional driving forces of the segmentation.  
6.2 Driving forces of informed capital provision and market segmentation  
In the following section we investigate whether specific features of the 
financial institutions’ portfolios influence the provision of informed capital. The 
literature clearly states that younger companies need more intensive monitoring and 
consulting (see i.e., Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Sorensen and 
Stuart, 2001). The effect of the investment horizon is less clear. On the one hand, a 
longer investment horizon may go hand-in-hand with a slower expected growth of the 
portfolio company. However, slow growth portfolio companies should have a smaller 
need for intensive involvement and consulting than fast growing companies. 
Furthermore, long-term investors often target stable and relatively safe firms but stay 
away from high-risk-high-return companies (Gompers, 1995). The former types of 
firms seem to be in the position to organize most of their growth themselves.
6 On the 
other hand, patience could be an indicator for a particularly strong commitment and, 
thus, signal heavy involvement in the firm.  
To estimate how both factors, the share of early stage investment (EARL) and 
the investment horizon (INVPER), influence the level of informed capital in both 
groups, we employ a small econometric model. We proxy the level of informed capital 
by two variables: the level of consulting (CS) undertaken by the financier and the 
degree of the financier’s direct influence (IFL). Both dependent variables are highly 
correlated with the amount of reports sent to the financier and with the frequency of 
the contacts. Thus, high values of CF and IFL indicate an intense flow of information 
between the financial institution and the start-up company in both directions. To 
capture the effect of the type of the financial products on the segmentation, with 
respect to informed capital provision, we include the categorical variable for the used 
                                                 
6 Gompers (1995) explains the relationship between investment horizon and the level of monitoring with 
transaction costs. If the investment is not expected to need a lot monitoring then VC firms should avoid 
setting up a row of short-term financing contracts because of additional costs for writing contracts.  
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financial product. Finally, we employ two interaction dummies to detect possible 
distinctions between the bank group and the non-bank group by multiplying them with 
the dependent variables EARL and INVPER.  
The average investment period is missing in seventeen observations. Even 
though the missing values are almost equally distributed over the different groups, we 
have to be cautious when interpreting the results. We abstain from calculating the 
marginal effect due to the missing value problem in some specifications and to the 
ordinal character of the used variables. We only comment on the direction but not on 
the magnitude of the coefficients.  
We estimate four different model specifications for each of the two dependent 
variables. Table 5 presents the results of the ordered logit estimation. Consistent with 
the literature, we find that the ratio of early stage investments significantly influences 
the importance of consulting. However, the ratio has no statistically significant impact 
on the exertion of influence. The non-significance might be due to a waiting position 
of the financiers in early stages. The exertion of direct influence will become more 
important if the investor feels that his portfolio firm could be under pressure. However, 
distress problems mainly arise after the firm has existed for a certain period of time, 
e.g., through strong growth. Furthermore, early stage investments are usually smaller 
in magnitude than later stage investments (Gompers, 1995). Consequently, in the early 
stages the investor’s risk exposure is very high in nature and, therefore, his incentive to 
intervene might be rather low. The impact of early stage investments on the consulting 
activity is significantly positive for both non-banks and banks. Furthermore, we find a 
group-specific negative impact of the ratio of early stage investments on the financier’s 
influence for the bank-related group. This can partly be explained by the focus on 
credit and silent partnership products that have a significantly negative impact on the 
influences. 
The average investment period significantly affects the intensity of consulting, 
in particular for the bank-related group. The longer the investment horizon the less 
intensive the consulting is. This result is consistent with Gompers (1995) and rejects 
the assumption that patience may be an indicator for heavy involvement. The 
financier’s influence is not significantly affected the investment period neither for the 
non-bank group nor for the bank-related financiers.   
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Table 5: Determinants of informed capital
7 
   CS (1)  CS (2)  CS (3)  CS (4) IFL (1)  IFL (2)  IFL (3)  IFL (4) 
0.02*       -0.01      EARL 
(2.43)       (1.59)     
   -0.04*       -0.2    INVPER 
   (2.45)       (1.64)  
0.65 0.63 1.01  0.48  -0.84*  -0.99** -1.08*  -1.01*  CRED 
(1.64) (1.46) (1.77)  (0.74) (2,46) (2.47) (2.43) (2.02) 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.39  -0.48  -0.26 -0.28 -0.08 -0.08  MIHO25 
(0.39) (0.32) (1.04)  (1,17) (0.97) (1.05) (0.29) (0.27) 
-0.01 -0.01 0.54 0.52  0.53*  0.53* 0.25  0.26  MIHO50 
(0.32) (0.33) (1.10)  (1.02) (1.88) (1.88) (0.77) (0.78) 
-0.03 -0.04 0.24 -0.43  -0.40  -0.55*  -0.70*  -0.61  SLEEP 
(0.33) (0.36) (0.51)  (0.73) (1.43) (1.68) (2.07) (1.32) 
0.30 0.29 0.68  0.39  0.14 0.89 -0.56  -0.50  MEZZ 
(0.44) (0.45) (1.05)  (0.56) (0.35) (0.22) (0.89) (0.76) 
 0.02*      -0.01     Non-bank-
dummy   (2.03)      (0.92)    
 0.02*       -0.02*     Bank-
dummy   (2.14)      (1.80)    
    -0.02      0.02  Non-bank-
dummy      (0.79)     (1.61) 
   
-
0.05**     0.02  Bank-
dummy 
    (-2.78)     (1.15) 
observations  75 75 58  58  75 75 58 58 
* significant at a 5% level; ** significant at a 1%level       
 
The predominantly used financial products affect the influence by the financier 
on the financed firm but not the consulting activity. Minority holdings between 25 
percent and 50 percent show a positive impact on the influence. In contrast, credits and 
silent partnerships have a significantly negative impact on influence as the holder’s 
ability to exert influence is limited through the few rights of involvement. This finding 
does not necessarily contradict the Hausbank tradition of Germany’s credit 
institutions. Hausbank-relationships enable creditors to exert influence on an informal 
basis. Yet, as the exertion of influence is more of an ad hoc phenomenon according to 
                                                 
7 Ordered Logit Estimation; value of z-statistics in parenthesis  
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the perceived needs of the firm, it may not occur frequently enough to gain 
significance in our econometric estimation.  
The used financial product does not have a significant influence on the second 
and more important indicator for informed capital, the consulting activity by the 
financier. This result strengthens further our hypothesis that the institutional 
background of the financier is far more important for the provision of informed capital 
than the applied financial instrument. 
Overall, we can conclude that for both groups the level of informed capital is 
positively affected by the share of early stage investments in a portfolio. The average 
investment period turns out to exert a significantly negative influence in the bank-
related group but has no influence in the non-bank group.  We experimented with other 
possible determinants of informed capital such as the ratio of portfolio firms per 
investment manager or the size of the intermediary measured by the number of 
investment managers. Since we are unable to find any significant impact on the level 
of informed capital, we abstain from reporting these specifications. The observed 
rather minor impact of financial products on the level of informed capital – they only 
affect the influence exerted by the financier - is consistent with the attached control 
rights. Since both groups use the whole menu of financial products, the differences 
between bank-related financiers and non-banks seem to be predominantly caused by 
the financing institution itself.  
7.  Conclusion and Prospects 
In this paper we explore a special part of the German market for start-up 
finance: the market for informed capital. The analysis reveals a dichotomous 
separation of the market in Germany. One group consists of “bank-related” investors 
under which we subsume public and private banks, their equity subsidiaries, and public 
equity suppliers; the other group, the non-bank group, contains independent and 
corporate VC companies and Business Angels. In line with the previous research on 
relationship lending and similar to the VC literature, we find that both groups deliver 
informed capital. However, the extent and the manner are different. The non-bank 
group is well informed about the financed companies and offers a complete menu of 
informed capital services. In contrast, the bank-related financiers only offer a reduced  
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menu. In particular, these investors are less deeply involved in the financed businesses 
and offer less consulting.  
With respect to the determinants of informed capital, we find that the share of 
early stage investments in a portfolio and the investment horizon affect the level of 
informed capital. The influence of the offered financial product is minor. This result 
regarding the importance of the financial products is somewhat contrary to the 
literature on financial contracting but rather in line with the empirical literature on VC 
financing. It indicates that the observed separation of the market is mainly driven by 
the institutional background of the relational investors and less so by the offered 
financial product.  
Though we lack detailed data on the actual amount invested in start-ups by the 
different types of financiers, we can conclude from our survey results that the 
commitment to the provision of informed capital is still strong amongst Germany’s 
early stage financiers; despite the downturn in the market for start-ups and the 
breathtaking default rates in the portfolios. Moreover, the surviving companies of the 
still immature venture capital industry in Germany are struggling to overcome the 
slump in investment activity and fundraising, and they are trying to build a strong 
reputation as unique providers of a specific form of informed capital.  
Germany’s venture capital industry may gain some support for its ambition to 
achieve a more dominant position in the market for informed capital from two 
important legislative changes that only concern the banking sector. The state 
guarantees for Germany’s public savings banks have already been dropped due to 
restrictions from the European Union. The expiration of this guarantee will complicate 
refinancing and may lead to a change in the public banks’ business strategies. Such a 
change is likely to affect the public saving banks’ attitude towards relational investing. 
A second challenge for bank-related start-up investors comes from the new Capital 
Adequacy Directive (Basel II). This directive is likely to have further impact on the 
banks’ general attitude toward risky start-up finance. 
Although our analysis enables us to identify two distinct groups in the market 
for informed start-up capital, we are aware of the considerable heterogeneity among 
Germany’s relational investors. Each segment has its own business strategy and 
specific goals. The members are far from being homogeneous within each segment.  
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This could lead to incompatibilities between the financiers in case of syndication. 
Moreover, the observed heterogeneity suggests that entrepreneurs searching for capital 
have to specify exactly what form of capital and which level of consulting they need 
before they approach possible financiers.  
This observed heterogeneity of the providers for informed capital opens up 
areas for further research. First, syndication may show different results depending on 
whether the syndication is arranged within a group or between groups. Second, 
regional dispersion and its influence on both the investment strategy and the flow of 
information is an important issue for further research. And third, the question of how 
different forms of relational capital affect the success of the portfolio firms is still 
unexplored.
8  
                                                 
8 First steps in this direction have been made by De Clercq and Sapienza (2006) who analyze the 
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